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Abstract
This paper establishes three new results for multiproduct oligopolies: 1)
it presents the first explicit expression of Nash equilibria for asymmetric mul-
tiproduct oligopolies; 2) it shows that reducing a multiproduct firm’s cost in
Bertrand oligopolies will reduce its profits if the cost-reducing unit is suﬃ-
ciently small; and 3) it demonstrates that a multiproduct firm has no incentive
to eliminate a product whose sales are zero. Because a single-product firm
whose sales are zero is indiﬀerent between exiting and staying, and its cost re-
ductions always increase its profits, our results are unique to the multiproduct
firm, and they suggest that extending oligopoly studies from a single product
to multi-products could be as significant as the extension of calculus from a
single variable to multi-variables.
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1 Introduction
We study multiproduct oligopolies with asymmetric costs in both price and quantity
competition. We first derive closed-form expressions for multiproduct Bertrand and
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Cournot equilibria with asymmetric linear costs. To our knowledge, such equilibrium
expressions have not been reported in the existing literature. The few available ex-
pressions were limited either to duopolies (Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer [1985];
and Lal and Matutes [1989]) or to symmetric product lines (Grossmann [2003]), and
most other previous studies of multiproduct oligopolies were completed without the
general expressions.1 In the merger literature, Deneckere and Davidson ([4], 1985)
provided expressions for postmerger Bertrand equilibria with zero costs, which are
identical to a special class of multiproduct Bertrand equilibria. Because postmerger
Bertrand equilibria from an arbitrary coalition structure with asymmetric costs are
identical to a general multiproduct Bertrand equilibrium, their two-decade old as-
sessment that "it is no longer possible to write analytical expressions for equilibrium
payoﬀs" ([4], p. 481) was still an accurate account of today’s literature prior to this
study. The unavailability of a general expression for multiproduct equilibria was
caused perhaps by the unavailability of the involved tools or inverse matrices for solv-
ing the problem. Indeed, without using the new inverse matrices in Zhao and Howe
(2004), we would never have been able to obtain the equilibrium expressions.
Next, we evaluate the eﬀects of technological innovation. We show that reducing a
multiproduct firm’s cost could reduce its profits in price competition, but will always
increase its profits in quantity competition. The negative relationship between cost
reduction and profit explains why some firms are unwilling to reduce cost or adopt new
technologies, even if such cost reduction and technology adoption are free. Although
previous studies have shown how small cost reductions could reduce social welfare,
this study is the first to show how small cost reductions could reduce the cost—reducing
firm’s profits.2
At first glance, the negative profit eﬀect of cost reduction is counterintuitive, be-
1For example, Harrington (1987) studied collusion, Zhang and Zhang (1996) studied stability,
and Johnson and Myatt (2003) studied quality competition, all in multiproduct Cournot Oligopolies;
Cabral and Villas-Boas (2001) studied product externality in multiproduct Bertrand oligopolies; and
Goldberg (1995) estimated the multiproduct market of the US automobile industry.
2For recent works on the welfare eﬀects of cost reduction, see Février and Linnemer (2004) and
Smythe and Zhao (2006). Schelling ([13], 1960) showed the possibility that an exogenous increase
in a player’s payoﬀ function could reduce his equilibrium payoﬀ. However, it was not known, prior
to this study, if his game example ([13], p. 158) could arise from a general economic problem.
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cause conventional theory of the firm holds that a firm should always benefit from cost
reductions and technological innovations if the cost of obtaining such improvement is
zero or low. As readers will see, the negative eﬀect of cost reduction on a multiprod-
uct Bertrand firm’s profits is the confluence of three forces. One force is strategic
complementarity in price competition. If firms’ choices are strategic substitutes (such
as in Cournot competition), the profit eﬀects of cost reductions will always be posi-
tive. Another force is strategic interaction between the multiproduct firm and other
firms. If there are no strategic interactions (such as in a monopoly), cost reductions
will always increase profits. The other force is output reallocation: a cost reduction
in one unit increases the production in this unit, but decreases productions in all
other units inside the firm. These forces work to raise the profit of the cost-reducing
unit but lower the profits of all other units inside the multiproduct firm. When the
cost-reducing unit is small, its profit gain is outweighed by profit losses from all other
units, leading to a reduction in the multiproduct firm’s total profits. Precisely, we
derive two closed-form critical levels for identifying the profit eﬀects of cost reduction:
1) critical output share: a small reduction in the marginal cost of a small unit reduces
the multiproduct firm’s profits if and only if its output share in the multiproduct firm
is below the critical level; 2) critical size of cost reduction: a large reduction in the
marginal cost of a small unit reduces the multiproduct firm’s profit if and only if the
size of the cost reduction is below the critical level.
Finally, we show that a multiproduct firm has no incentive to eliminate a product
whose sales are zero. Because a single-product firm whose sales are zero is indiﬀerent
between exiting and staying, and its cost reductions always increase its profits, our
results are unique to the multiproduct firm; they support the belief that extending
oligopoly studies from a single product to multi-products could be as significant as
the extension of calculus from a single variable to multi-variables.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model
and provides the closed-form expressions for multiproduct Bertrand and Cournot
equilibria in asymmetric linear oligopolies. Section 3 studies the profit eﬀects of a
Bertrand firm’s cost reduction and product closing, and section 4 studies the same
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issues for a Cournot firm. Section 5 concludes the paper, and the appendix provides
all proofs.
2 Calculation of Bertrand and Cournot Equilibria
A linear Bertrand oligopoly with n goods, or the Bertrand-Shubik model, is defined
by n demand and n cost functions (see Bertrand [1883], Shubik [1980]):
qi(p) = V − pi − γ(pi − p), Ci(qi) = ciqi, i ∈ N = {1, ..., n}, (1)
where V > 0 is the common intercept of demand functions, pi is the price of good
i, p = (p1, . . . , pn)> is the price vector, γ ≥ 0 is the substitutability parameter, p =
(
Pn
j=1 pj)/n is the average price, and ci is the constant marginal (or average) cost of
producing good i.
These goods are independent if γ = 0, and they become closer substitutes as
γ increases toward infinity. They can be supplied by a multiproduct monopoly,
by n single-product firms, or by k multiproduct firms (1 < k < n), which corre-
spond, respectively, to three classes of market structures (i.e., partitions of N): i) a
multiproduct monopoly, or the coarsest partition ∆m = {N}; ii) an oligopoly with
single-product firms, or the finest partition ∆0 = {1, 2, ..., n}; and iii) an oligopoly
with multiproduct firms, or a general partition ∆ = {S1, S2, ..., Sk} of N (i.e., Si 6= ∅,
Si∩Sj = ∅, all i 6= j, and ∪Sj = N), where 1 < k < n, and for each j = 1, ..., k, firm
Sj produces |Sj| = nj products (i.e.,
Pk
j=1 nj = n).
For each firm S ∈ ∆, let pS = {pi| i ∈ S} and qS = {qi| i ∈ S} denote its price
and output vectors, and p−S = {pi| i ∈ N\S} denote the vector of other firms’ prices.
Then, for each p = (pS, p−S) = (p1, . . . , pn)>, the profit of a firm S ∈ ∆ is given by
πS(p) = πS(pS, p−S) =
X
i∈S
πi(p) =
X
i∈S
qi(p)(pi − ci), (2)
and the Bertrand equilibrium (or Nash equilibrium or strategic equilibrium) is a price
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vector p∗ = {p∗S| S ∈ ∆} = (p∗1, . . . , p∗n)> such that for each firm S ∈ ∆, p∗S is its best
response to others’ price vector p∗−S, or that each p
∗
S solves Max{πS(pS, p∗−S)|pS},
where πS(pS, p−S) is given in (2).
Throughout the paper we assume that a unique equilibrium always exists. Under
this assumption, the Bertrand equilibrium for ∆ = {S1, S2, ..., Sk} is the solution to
the following k sets of first-order conditions:
For each S ∈ ∆, and all i ∈ S, ∂πS(pS, p−S)
∂pi
= 0. (3)
Rearranging (3) leads to the following properties on the equilibrium markups: for
each firm j = 1, ..., k, or each Sj ∈ ∆ with |Sj| = nj,
(1 + γ) (p∗i − ci) = q∗i +
njγ(p∗Sj − cSj)
n
, all i ∈ Sj, (4)
p∗Sj − cSj
q∗Sj
=
n
n(1 + γ)− njγ
, and (5)
p∗j − cj
q∗j
=
n
n(1 + γ)− γ , for all j with nj = 1. (6)
where p∗Sj =
P
i∈Sj p
∗
i /nj, cSj =
P
i∈Sj ci/nj, and q
∗
Sj =
P
i∈Sj q
∗
i /nj are firm j’s
average price, average marginal cost, and average supply, respectively. By (6), all
single-product firms have the same markup/supply ratio, n/ (n(1 + γ)− γ). And by
(4) and (5), diﬀerent units in a multiproduct firm may have diﬀerent markup/supply
ratios, and a multiproduct firm has a larger average-markup/average-supply ratio
than does a single-product firm (i.e., n/ (n(1 + γ)− njγ) > n/ (n(1 + γ)− γ)).
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Let δ, a, b, c > 0 and d = {dS| S ∈ ∆} = (d1, . . . , dn)> be defined as
δ = n(1 + γ)− γ;
a = 2δ, b = 2γ, c = γ; and for each S ∈ ∆, (7)
dS = {di| i ∈ S}, where di = nV + δci − γΣj∈S\icj, all i ∈ S.
Then, the first-order conditions in (3) can be rearranged as
Ap = d, where A = An×n =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
A11 A12 · · · A1k
A21 A22 · · · A2k
...
...
. . .
...
Ak1 Ak2 · · · Akk
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(8)
is an n × n matrix with k2 blocks whose entries are: 1) for j = 1, ..., k, Ajj is an
nj × nj symmetric matrix such that all its main diagonal entries are a, and all its
oﬀ-diagonal entries are −b, where nj = |Sj| is the number of goods produced by firm
Sj ∈ ∆; 2) for all i 6= j, Aij is an ni × nj matrix whose entries are all −c; and 3)Pk
j=1 nj = n.
In order to analyze how cost reductions or technological changes aﬀect equilibrium
profits, we focus on the class of Bertrand oligopolies with a single multiproduct firm
given by ∆ = {S,m+ 1, ..., n} = {{1, ...,m},m+ 1, ..., n}. Due to the complexity of
the problem (readers could get a taste of such complexity by examining the detailed
formulae in (39)), studying the general case in (8) or its solution in (22) would deviate
from our emphasis on cost reductions.
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Given ∆ = {S,m+ 1, ..., n}, the first-order conditions in (3) become
∂
P
k∈S πk
∂pi
= 0, all i ∈ S; and ∂πj(p)
∂pj
= 0, all j ∈ N\S, (9)
which is a special case of (8).
The inverse demands of the Bertrand-Shubik demand system given in (1) are:
pi(q) = pi(q1, . . . , qn) = V − qi +
γ
1 + γ
(qi − q), (10)
where q = (
Pn
j=1 qj)/n is the industry’s average output. Now, firm i’s profit function
becomes πi(q) = (pi(q)− ci)qi. A Cournot oligopoly with k multiproduct firms is also
defined by the partition ∆ = {S1, S2, ..., Sk} with 1 ≤ k < n. For each firm S ∈ ∆,
its profit is given by πS(q) = πS(qS, q−S) =
P
i∈S πi(q) =
P
i∈S(pi(q) − ci)qi. The
Cournot equilibrium is an output vector qC∗ = {qC∗S | S ∈ ∆} = (qC∗1 , . . . , qC∗n )> such
that for each S ∈ ∆, qC∗S is its best response to others’ output vector qC∗−S, or that each
qC∗S solvesMax{πS(qS, qC∗−S)|qS}. Under the assumption for a unique equilibrium, the
Cournot equilibrium for ∆ = {S1, S2, ..., Sk} is the solution to the following k sets of
first-order conditions:
For each S ∈ ∆, and all i ∈ S, ∂πS(qS, q−S)
∂qi
= 0. (11)
Let a, b, c > 0 and d = (d1, . . . , dn)> be defined as
a = 2(n+ γ), b = −2γ, c = −γ, (12)
di = n(1 + γ)(V − ci), all i ∈ N.
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Then, the first-order conditions in (11) can be rearranged as
Bq = d, where B = Bn×n =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
B11 B12 · · · B1k
B21 B22 · · · B2k
...
...
. . .
...
Bk1 Bk2 · · · Bkk
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(13)
is identical to A in (8) except that the constants a, b, c, and d in (7) are replaced by
a, b, c, and d in (12).
As in the Bertrand model, we focus on Cournot oligopolies with a single multi-
product firm given by ∆ = {S,m+ 1, ..., n}, whose first-order conditions are:
∂
P
j∈S πj
∂qi
= 0, all i ∈ S; and ∂πi(q)
∂qi
= 0, all i ∈ N\S. (14)
Rearranging the above first-order conditions leads to:
(1 + γ) (pi − ci) = qi +
mγqS
n
, all i ∈ S, (15)
pS − cS
qS
=
n+mγ
n(1 + γ)
, and (16)
pi − ci
qi
=
n+ γ
n(1 + γ)
, all i ∈ N\S, (17)
so the markups in a Cournot model are analogous to those in the Bertrand model in
(4-6): single-product firms have the same markup/supply ratio, diﬀerent units in the
multiproduct firm might have diﬀerent markup/supply ratios, and the multiproduct
firm’s average-markup/average-supply ratio is larger.
Applying the general inverse in (39) to (13-14) leads to the following Cournot
equilibrium with multiproduct firms:
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Proposition 1 Consider the Cournot oligopoly in (10). (i) Given∆ = {S1, S2, ..., Sk},
its Cournot equilibrium is given by
qC∗ = B−1d =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
W11 W12 · · · W1k
W21 W22 · · · W2k
...
...
. . .
...
Wk1 Wk2 · · · Wkk
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
dS1
dS2
...
dSk
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, (18)
where B−1 = W is the same as that of (39), except that the constants a, b, c, and d
in (7) are replaced by a, b, c, and d in (12).
(ii) Given ∆ = {S,m + 1, ..., n}, the Cournot equilibrium in (18) becomes: for
each unit i ∈ S, and each single-product firm j ∈ N\S,
qC∗i =
n(1 + γ)(2n+ γ)V
ω1
+
(1 + γ)(4n+ (n−m+ 2) γ)mγcS
2ω1
+
n(1 + γ)(n−m)γc−S
ω1
− (1 + γ)ci
2
; and (19)
qC∗j =
n(1 + γ)(2n+mγ)V
ω1
+
n(1 + γ)mγcS
ω1
+
n (n−m) (1 + γ)(2n+mγ)γc−S
(2n+ γ)ω1
− n(1 + γ)cj
2n+ γ
, (20)
where cS =
P
k∈S ck/m, c−S =
P
k/∈S ck/(n−m), and ω1 > 0 is given by
ω1 = ω1(n,m, γ) = m(n−m+ 2)γ2 + 2n (n+m+ 1) γ + 4n2. (21)
Similarly, one can show that the Bertrand equilibrium for ∆ = {S1, S2, ..., Sk} in
(1) is given by
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p∗ = A−1d =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
U11 U12 · · · U1k
U21 U22 · · · U2k
...
...
. . .
...
Uk1 Uk2 · · · Ukk
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
dS1
dS2
...
dSk
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ , (22)
where the inverse matrix A−1 = U in (39) is defined by parameters in (7-8). As a
special case, the Bertrand equilibrium for ∆ = {S,m + 1, ..., n} are: for each unit
i ∈ S, and each single-product firm j ∈ N\S,
p∗i =
n(2n(1 + γ)− γ)V
ω2
+
γ2m (n−m) cS
2ω2
+
γ(n(1 + γ)− γ)(n−m)c−S
ω2
+
ci
2
, (23)
p∗j =
n(2n(1 + γ)−mγ)V
ω2
+
γm (n(1 + γ)−mγ) cS
ω2
(24)
+
γ (n(1 + γ)− γ) (2n(1 + γ)−mγ) (n−m) c−S
(2n(1 + γ)− γ)ω2
+
(n(1 + γ)− γ)cj
2n(1 + γ)− γ ,
where ω2 = ω2(n,m, γ) > 0 is given by
ω2(n,m, γ) = γ2 (n−m) (m+ 2n− 2) + 2nγ (3n−m− 1) + 4n2. (25)
It is useful to note that the above closed-form expressions for Cournot and
Bertrand equilibria with multiproduct firms are identical to the corresponding post-
merger equilibria for mergers with no synergy in linear diﬀerentiated oligopolies with
single-product firms. To our knowledge, such general expressions have not been re-
ported in the existing literature.3 We hope that other scholars will find them useful
in extending previous studies in single-product oligopoly to multiproduct oligopolies.
3The only exception is the Bertrand equilibrium (23-24) for ∆ = {S,m + 1, ..., n}, which is
identical to the postmerger equilibrium reported in Zhao and Howe (2004); with cj = 0 for all
j, (23-24) are identical to the postmerger equilibrium with zero costs reported in Deneckere and
Davidson (1985, p. 475).
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In the next two sections, we will conduct the comparative statics analysis of the
above Cournot and Bertrand equilibria.
3 Cost Reductions in Price Competition
Plugging the Bertrand equilibrium in (23-24) into the demand (1) and simplifying,
one obtains the equilibrium products as below: for each i ∈ S and j ∈ N\S,
q∗i =
(2n(1 + γ)− γ) (n(1 + γ)−mγ)V
ω2
+
γ (n(1 + γ)− γ) (n(1 + γ)−mγ) (n−m)c−S
nω2
+
γ[γ2 (3n− 2) (n−m) + γn (7n− 3m− 2) + 4n2]mcS
2nω2
− (1 + γ)ci
2
, (26)
q∗j =
(2n(1 + γ)−mγ)(n(1 + γ)− γ)V
ω2
+
γm (n(1 + γ)−mγ) (n(1 + γ)− γ)cS
nω2
+
γ (n(1 + γ)− γ)2 (2n(1 + γ)−mγ) (n−m) c−S
n(2n(1 + γ)− γ)ω2
− (1 + γ)(n(1 + γ)− γ)cj
2n(1 + γ)− γ ,
which lead to the following equilibrium profits:
π∗S =
X
i∈S
(p∗i − ci) q∗i =
m (n(1 + γ)−mγ) (p∗S − cS)2
n
+
(1 + γ)
Pm
i=1(cS − ci)2
4
,
π∗j =
[n(1 + γ)− γ](p∗j − cj)2
n
, for each j ∈ N\S. (27)
The multiproduct firm’s average price is equal to p∗S = (
P
i∈S p
∗
i )/m =
n(2n(1 + γ)− γ)V
ω2
+
(2n+ (m+ n− 1)γ) (n+ (n−m)γ) cS
ω2
+
γ(n(1 + γ)− γ)(n−m)c−S
ω2
,
(28)
and the equilibrium markups are: for each j ∈ N\S and each unit i ∈ S,
11
p∗j − cj =
nq∗j
n(1 + γ)− γ , (29)
p∗i − ci =
n(2n(1 + γ)− γ)V
ω2
+
γ (n(1 + γ)− γ) (n−m)c−S
ω2
+
γ2m (n−m) cS
2ω2
− ci
2
,
p∗S − cS =
n(2n(1 + γ)− γ)V
ω2
+
γ(n(1 + γ)− γ)(n−m)c−S
ω2
− ω3cS
ω2
,
where ω2 is given in (25), q∗j is given in (26), and ω3 > 0 is given by
ω3(n,m, γ) = γ2 (n− 1) (n−m) + γn (3n−m− 1) + 2n2. (30)
Proposition 2 below reports the eﬀects of small cost reductions in Bertrand
oligopolies, whose closed-form expressions are given in (42-46) in Appendix A.
Proposition 2 Consider the Bertrand oligopoly (1) with a single multiproduct firm
given by ∆ = {S,m+ 1, ..., n}.
(i) For each single-product firm j ∈ N\S, a small reduction in cj increases its
output and profit, and decreases all other outputs and all other firms’ profits.
(ii) For each unit i ∈ S, a small reduction in ci increases output i, decreases
all other outputs and all single-product firms’ profits; and increases the multiproduct
firm’s profits if and only if its output share is above a critical level, or precisely if and
only if tSi > btS = γ2 (n−m) /ω2, where tSi = q∗i /Pmj=1 q∗j is its output share among
the products of S and ω2 is given in (25).
An examination of the markups in (29) shows that a reduction in ci increases unit
i’s markup and decreases the markups in all other units (see (43) in the proof). Be-
cause unit i’s output increases and the outputs in all other units decrease, a reduction
in ci increases unit i’s profits, but at the same time decreases the profits of all other
units. The balance of these two opposite eﬀects explains why a multiproduct firm
might be unwilling to reduce its cost : small cost reductions in one product will reduce
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the multiproduct firm’s profits if and only if the output share of the cost-reducing
unit is below the critical level btS.4 Call a unit an eﬃcient unit if its marginal cost
is below the multiproduct firm’s average marginal cost (i.e., cS − ci > 0). Then, as
shown in the corollary below, cost reductions in an eﬃcient unit will always increase
the multiproduct firm’s profits.
Corollary 1 (i) For each i ∈ S, ∂π∗S/∂ci < 0 if ci < cS.
(ii) Let m = n (i.e., S = N) and π∗S = π
∗
N be the monopoly profit. Then, for all
i ∈ N, ∂π∗N/∂ci < 0.
The negative profit eﬀects of a small cost reduction also can be characterized by
critical levels of marginal costs for each cost-reducing unit, which is given below:
Corollary 2 Given ∆ = {S,m + 1, ..., n}, let π∗S be the multiproduct firm’s profits.
Then, for each i ∈ S, ∂π∗S/∂ci > 0⇔ ci > bcSi , where bcSi is the critical level of unit i’s
marginal cost given in (49) in Appendix A.
Corollary 2 can be understood geometrically as shown below. An examination of
the profits in (27) indicates that π∗S = π
∗
S(ci) is convex and quadratic in ci, with bcSi
as its minimum point defined by ∂π∗S/∂ci = 0. Because π
∗
S is symmetric in ci around
ci = bcSi , small reductions in ci reduce π∗S if and only if ci is on the right half of the
profit curve where π∗S is increasing in ci (i.e., ci > bcSi ).
The counterintuitive negative relationship between cost reduction in small units
and the multiproduct firm’s profits is caused by the combined strength of at least three
forces. The first force is strategic complementarity in price competition (see Appendix
B or Bulow et al. [1985] for definition). Without strategic complementarity, as in a
4Obviously, if a small reduction in unit i’s marginal cost ci decreases the firm’s profits, then a
small reduction in the marginal cost of any other unit whose marginal cost is greater than ci will
also reduce the firm’s profits.
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Cournot model in which firms’ choices are strategic substitutes, the profit eﬀects of
cost reductions will always be positive (see next section). The second force is strategic
interaction between the multiproduct and single-product firms. Similar to Zhao and
Howe (2004), their reaction functions (in terms of average prices, pS =
P
i∈S pi/m
and p−S =
P
j /∈S pj/(n−m)) are:
pS = h(p−S) =
nV + (n+ (n−m)γ)cS + γ(n−m)p−S
2n+ (2n− 2m)γ , and (31)
p−S = g(pS) =
nV + (n+ (n− 1)γ)c−S + γmpS
2n+ (m+ n− 1)γ . (32)
By (31), the multiproduct firm’s cost reduction (i.e., a decrease in cS) directly causes
a reduction in its average price. Such a reduction in pS, by (32), leads to a decrease
in p−S, which causes a second-round reduction in pS through the reaction curve (31).
Without such strategic interactions, as in the monopoly case of Corollary 1, cost
reductions will always increase the firm’s profits.
Finally, the third force is the multiplicity of products, which allows internal reallo-
cation of resources within a firm. As inputs are transferred from eﬃcient and large
units to the cost-reducing unit, outputs of all eﬃcient units decrease, which causes
the firm’s overall profits to decrease.
As shown in Lemma 1 in Appendix B, small cost reductions could not reduce profit
in homogeneous Cournot oligopolies even with strong strategic complementarity. This
indicates that the above negative profit eﬀect of small cost reductions is a unique
feature of multiproduct Bertrand oligopolies. Although the assumptions of Lemma
1 are weaker than the standard assumptions in most previous studies, some readers
still might believe that profit-reducing cost reductions could exist in homogeneous
Cournot oligopolies after removing the assumptions of Lemma 1. We encourage such
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believers to find a counterexample.5
Observe that the negative profit eﬀects are caused by small cost reductions in
an ineﬃcient unit. If the magnitude of cost reduction is suﬃciently large, the profit
eﬀects will be positive. Proposition 3 below provides the critical magnitude above
which large cost reductions will increase profits.
Proposition 3 Given ∆ = {S,m+ 1, ..., n} in the Bertrand oligopoly (1), let unit 1
be the most eﬃcient unit of S (i.e., c1 = min{ci | 1 ≤ i ≤ m}). Consider each unit
i ∈ S with ci > bcSi , where bcSi is given in (49).
(i) A large reduction in ci increases the multiproduct firm’s profits if and only if
the reduction is larger than twice the diﬀerence between ci and bcSi .
(ii) The multiproduct firm’s profits will increase if ci is reduced to the most eﬃcient
level c1.
Parts (i) and (ii) together imply that the magnitude of reducing ci to c1 is larger
than twice the diﬀerence between ci and bcSi (i.e., ci−c1 > 2(ci−bcSi )). In particular, it
implies that a technology spillover within S that reduces all units’ marginal costs to
c1 will increase the multiproduct firm’s profits. As shown in the proof, by the time
unit i becomes an eﬃcient unit (i.e., its output share reaches 1/m, or equivalently, its
marginal cost is reduced to the firm’s average marginal cost), the multiproduct firm’s
profits would have risen above the initial level. When unit i eventually becomes the
5One should be aware of at least three hurdles before embarking on such an enquiry. First, the
existence of Cournot equilibrium with strategic complementarity is less known, because the known
existence condition is that goods are strategic substitutes (i.e., αi = p0(X) + xip00(X) ≤ 0, see
Novshek [1985] and Shapiro [1989]). Second, as Vives (2005) pointed out, strategic complementarity
leads to equilibrium existence without the second-order conditions, which would require solving
anti-decision problems such as maximizing a convex function on an interval [0, y]. Although such
problems are relevant in game situations, it is hard to apply them in industrial organization because
a firm’s optimal choice will be either to shut down or to operate at full capacity (i.e., it can never be
interior), which will destroy much of the existing wage theory and factor pricing theory. Third, the
proof of Lemma 1 shows that ∂π∗i /∂ci < 0 holds if E < −(n+ 1) (by αi > 0 and by (57)). Hence,
∂π∗i /∂ci > 0 can possibly hold only in the tiny interval [−n− 1, −n− 1/2] among all E ∈ (−∞,∞),
where E = Xp00(X)/p0(X) is the elasticity of the slope of inverse demand.
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most eﬃcient unit (i.e., its marginal cost reaches c1), the multiproduct firm’s profits
will rise further.
Example 1 below illustrates the above results.
Example 1: Let n = 3, V = 9, γ = 2, c1 = 5.9, c2 = 7.23, c3 = 4, and S = {1, 2}.
One gets: p∗1 ≈ 6.8459, p∗2 ≈ 7.5109, p∗3 ≈ 5.9795; q∗1 ≈ 2.0198, q∗2 ≈ 0.0248,
q∗3 ≈ 4.6189; and ω2 = 132. Consider i = 2. By Proposition 2 and tS2 =
q∗2/(q
∗
1 + q
∗
2) ≈ 0.0122 < btS ≈ 0.0303, or by Corollary 2 and c2 = 7.23 >bcS2 ≈ 7.1968, ∂π∗S/∂c2 > 0 holds. Indeed, one can check that ∂π∗S/∂c2 ≈
0.0371 > 0. For a small reduction in c2 from 7.23 to 7.2, the multiproduct firm’s
profits will decrease from π∗S = π
∗
1 + π
∗
2 ≈ 1.9176 to eπS ≈ 1.9170. However, a
large reduction in c2 from 7.23 to 7.15 will, by Proposition 3 and ∆c2 = 0.08
> 2(ci − bcSi ) ≈ 0.0664, increase the profits from 1.9176 to eπS ≈ 1.9182.
It is striking to see that a small increase in c2 will raise π∗S. For example, let c2
be increased from 7.23 to c∗2 = 7.2518, the profits will be raised to eπ∗∗S ≈ 1.9187 >
π∗S ≈ 1.9176, and eπ∗∗3 ≈ 9.1587 > π∗3 ≈ 9.1431, with the new equilibrium outputs as:eq∗∗1 ≈ 2.0277, eq∗∗2 ≈ 0.0000, eq∗∗3 ≈ 4.6228. It is useful to note that c2 has been raised
to its upper bound c∗2 = 7.2518, at which demand for the second product is zero.
The above analysis of a multiproduct firm’s behavior implies a long list of interest-
ing topics for future study. Below we discuss two such future topics. First, we do not
wish to jump to an explanation why some firm’s costs are high (we only explained why
some firms are unwilling to reduce costs), although our numerical example indicates
so (i.e., a firm could increase its profits by overly increasing its costs).6 However,
we believe that our analysis can be modified so that future studies can explain why
6A real firm might not want to take such cost-increasing measures (such as paying its workers a
higher wage), because the profit increase is small as compared with possible damage to its reputation,
and the firm might be prevented from paying a higher wage to its workers in the small and ineﬃcient
unit by union contract, because workers in other (eﬃcient) units also are entitled to a pay raise.
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some firms’ costs are high, by analyzing, for example, a two-stage cost-setting model
in which firms first choose costs and then engage in price competition.
Second, the above situation with a zero demand for an ineﬃcient product provides
a new approach to understanding multiproduct choices such as closing the production
of an ineﬃcient product, keeping some empty first-class seats by an airline, and
exhibiting an astronomically priced item in a showroom that no one will buy. Recall
that a single-product firm whose sales are zero is indiﬀerent between exiting and
staying. In the above situation with eq∗∗2 = 0, is the multiproduct firm also indiﬀerent
between keeping and closing this unit? The answer is no. Direct calculations show
that if unit 2 is removed (i.e., S becomes a single-product firm), the new profits are:
πD1 ≈ 1.4603 < eπCS ≈ 2.1533, πD3 ≈ 7.6163 < eπC3 ≈ 9.3677, so both firm S = {1, 2}
and firm 3 are worse oﬀ with the closing of the idled second unit. Proposition 4 below
shows that this property holds in a large class of multiproduct oligopolies.
Proposition 4 Consider the Bertrand-Shubik oligopoly (1) with a single two-product
firm given by ∆ = {S, 3, ..., n}, where S = {1, 2}. Suppose that c1 = c− µ and ci = c
for i = 2, ..., n. Then there exists a unique µ > 0 such that the inferior inside
firm 2 produces zero output in equilibrium. However, removing product 2 from the
two-product firm will decrease all firms’ profits.
Note that Proposition 4 shares a feature of the dominant cartel model in that
the multiproduct firm’s ineﬃcient unit and all single-product firms have the same
marginal costs. In such oligopolies, both the multi- and single-product firms are
worse oﬀ if the high cost unit with a zero demand is closed by the multiproduct firm.
Although this conclusion is derived from a simple model, its proof is quite involved
due to the complexity of the problem. It remains to be seen if the conclusion can be
extended to more general models.
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4 Cost Reductions in Quantity Competition
This section shows that the perverse profit eﬀect of small cost reductions does not
exist in quantity competition and that a multiproduct firm in quantity competition
also has no incentive to close an ineﬃcient unit whose demand is zero.
Substituting the Cournot equilibrium in (19-20) into the inverse demand (10) and
simplifying, one obtains the equilibrium prices as given below: for each unit i ∈ S
and each single-product firm j ∈ N\S,
pC∗i =
(2n+ γ)(n+mγ)V
ω1
− m(n−m)γ
2cS
2ω1
+
(n−m)(n+mγ)γc−S
ω1
+
ci
2
; (33)
pC∗j =
(n+ γ)qC∗j
n(1 + γ)
+ cj, (34)
which lead to the equilibrium profits as given below:
πC∗S =
mn(1 + γ)(pC∗S − cS)2
n+mγ
+
(1 + γ)
Pm
i=1(cS − ci)2
4
; and (35)
πC∗j =
n(1 + γ)(pC∗j − cj)2
(n+ γ)
, all j ∈ N\S,
where the multiproduct firm’s average price is equal to pC∗S = (
P
i∈S p
C∗
i )/m =
(2n+ γ)(n+mγ)V
ω1
+
(2n2 + n(n+m+ 1)γ +mγ2)cS
ω1
+
(n−m)(n+mγ)γc−S
ω1
,
(36)
and the equilibrium markups are: for each j ∈ N\S and each unit i ∈ S,
pC∗j − cj =
(n+ γ)qC∗j
n(1 + γ)
, (37)
pC∗i − ci =
(2n+ γ)(n+mγ)V
ω1
− m(n−m)γ
2cS
2ω1
+
(n−m)(n+mγ)γc−S
ω1
− ci
2
,
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where qC∗j is given in (20).
Direct calculations lead to the following eﬀects of a firm’s small cost reduction,
whose closed-form expressions are given in (52-54) in Appendix A:
Proposition 5 Consider the Cournot oligopoly (10) with a single multiproduct firm.
(i) A small reduction in a single product firm’s marginal cost increases its product
and profit, and it reduces all other firms’ products and profits.
(ii) A small reduction in the multiproduct firm’s marginal cost ci increases its
profit and product i, and it reduces all other products and all single-product firms’
profits.
By the proposition, a Cournot firm’s profits always increase after its cost reduc-
tions. Although such eﬀects on multiproduct firm’s profits are similar to those in
single-product Cournot models, they are not as obvious as in single-product models.
An examination of the markups in (37) indicates that (see (53) in proof) a reduction
in unit i’s marginal cost increases the markups in all of the multiproduct firm’s prod-
ucts. Because the cost reduction increases product i and decreases all other products,
unit i’s profit increases while profits in the multiproduct firm’s other units might
increase or decrease; such reasoning, therefore, leads to an ambiguous profit eﬀects.
Proposition 5 clarifies such ambiguity and shows that the overall eﬀects on the multi-
product firm’s profits are positive. The following numerical example illustrates such
eﬀects.
Example 2: Let n = 3, V = 9, γ = 2, c1 = 5.9, c2 = 7.2, c3 = 4, and S = {1, 2}. One
gets: qC∗1 ≈ 1.9636, qC∗2 ≈ 0.0136, qC∗3 ≈ 4.1045; πC∗1 ≈ 2.1481, πC∗2 ≈ 0.0061,
πC∗3 ≈ 9.3596. By Proposition 5, ∂πC∗S /∂ci < 0 (i = 1, 2) holds. Indeed, one can
check that ∂πC∗S /∂c1 ≈ −2.0236 < 0 and ∂πC∗S /∂c2 ≈ −0.0736 < 0, so a small
increase in either c1 or c2 will lower πC∗S . For example, let c2 be increased to
c2 = 7.2125. The new equilibrium becomes: eqC1 ≈ 1.9687, eqC2 ≈ 0, eqC3 ≈ 4.1063;
19
and the new profits are: eπCS ≈ eπC1 ≈ 2.1533 < πC∗S = πC∗1 + πC∗2 ≈ 2.1542,eπC3 ≈ 9.3677 > πC∗3 ≈ 9.3596. Note that c2 has been increased to its upper
bound at which the demand for second product is zero.
Similar to price competition in Proposition 4, Proposition 6 below shows that a
multiproduct firm in quantity competition also has no incentive to eliminate a product
whose sales are zero.
Proposition 6 Consider the Cournot oligopoly (10) with a single two-product firm
given by ∆ = {S, 3, ..., n}, where S = {1, 2}. Suppose that c1 = c − µ and ci = c
for i = 2, ..., n. Then there exists a unique µ > 0 such that the inferior inside
firm 2 produces zero output in equilibrium. However, removing product 2 from the
two-product firm will decrease all firms’ profits.
5 Conclusion and Discussion
We have provided closed-form expressions for both Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in
multiproduct oligopolies with diﬀerentiated goods and asymmetric costs. Analyzing
these expressions allowed us to provide two new understandings about a multiproduct
firm’s behavior.
First, we have shown that reducing a multiproduct firm’s cost will reduce its
profits in price competition if the cost-reducing unit is suﬃciently small. This not
only explains why firms are sometimes unwilling to reduce their cost, but also lends
support to empirical observations that multiproduct firms do not always strive to
improve the eﬃciency level of all units. For example, it is well documented that
diﬀerent units (and plants) within an auto manufacturer can have very diﬀerent levels
of eﬃciency, and that the variance in eﬃciency within a manufacturer can sometimes
be greater than that between diﬀerent manufacturers. More specifically, we have
20
characterized the critical level of output share below which a small reduction in the
marginal cost of a small unit reduces the multiproduct firm’s profits, as well as the
critical size of cost reduction above which a large reduction in the marginal cost of a
small unit increases the multiproduct firm’s profit.
Second, we have shown that a multiproduct firm has no incentive to eliminate an
ineﬃcient product with zero demand in both price and quantity competition, which
also sheds lights on understanding other multiproduct choices, such as why airlines
often keep some empty first-class seats and why suppliers often exhibit astronomically
priced items in their showroom that no one will buy.
These two new results are obviously beyond the boundaries of single-product
oligopoly studies, and they indicate that much more remains to be explored in under-
standing the behavior of multiproduct oligopolies. We hope readers will be encour-
aged to apply our expressions for a general multiproduct equilibrium in extending
oligopoly studies from single- to multiproduct. Such extensions, we believe, are not
only a significant step closer to reality, but also will be as rewarding as the extension
of calculus from single to multi-variable.
Appendix A
The Inverse of A in (8) (see [19]): Let U = (uij)n×n = A−1 denote the inverse
of A given in (8). For i = 1, ..., k, define
βi =
µ
ni +
a+ (1− ni)b
c
¶−1
=
c
a+ b+ (c− b)ni
, (38)
α =
kX
i=1
βini = c
kX
i=1
ni
a+ b+ (c− b)ni
,
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θi =
1
1− α
⎛
⎜⎝βini +
c
b
kX
j=1
j 6=i
βjnj
⎞
⎟⎠ = 1
1− α
³
βini +
c
b
(α− βini)
´
, and
assume α 6= 1 and a+ b+ (c− b)ni 6= 0, all i. Then, A−1 = U =
1
a+ b
I +
1
c
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
bβ1(1+θ1)
(a+b) En1×n1
β1β2
(1−α)En1×n2 · · · β1βk(1−α)En1×nk
β2β1
(1−α)En2×n1
bβ2(1+θ2)
(a+b) En2×n2 · · · β2βk(1−α)En2×nk
...
...
. . .
...
βkβ1
(1−α)Enk×n1
βkβ2
(1−α)Enk×n2 · · · bβk(1+θk)(a+b) Enk×nk
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, (39)
where Eni×nj is an ni×nj matrix of 1s. In other words, the inverse A−1, given
below, has the same block structure as A:
A−1 = U =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
U11 U12 · · · U1k
U21 U22 · · · U2k
...
...
. . .
...
Uk1 Uk2 · · · Ukk
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ ,
where
Uii =
1
a+ b
Ini×ni +
bβi(1 + θi)
c(a+ b)
Eni×ni , i = 1, ..., k; and (40)
Uij =
βi(c+ bθj)
c(a+ b)
Eni×nj , all j 6= i.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: Part (i). It follows from (13) and (39).
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Part (ii). The first order conditions in (14) can be rearranged as
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
2(n+ γ) 2γ · · · 2γ γ · · · γ
2γ 2(n+ γ) · · · 2γ γ · · · γ
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
2γ 2γ · · · 2(n+ γ) γ · · · γ
γ γ · · · γ 2(n+ γ) · · · γ
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
γ γ · · · γ γ · · · 2(n+ γ)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
q1
q2
...
qm
qm+1
...
qn
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
n(1 + γ)(V − c1)
n(1 + γ)(V − c2)
...
n(1 + γ)(V − cm)
n(1 + γ)(V − cm+1)
...
n(1 + γ)(V − cn)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, or Bq = d. (41)
Applying the main inverse in (39) to (41) gives the following inverse for B:
B−1 =
"
1
2nIm 0
0 1
2n+γ In−m
#
− γ
ω1
"
4n+(n−m+2)γ
2n Em×m Em×(n−m)
E(n−m)×m
2n+mγ
2n+γ E(n−m)×(n−m)
#
,
where ω1 > 0 is given by (21), Ik is the k × k identity matrix and Ek×j is the
k × j matrix of all 1s. The equilibrium is given by
qC∗ = B−1
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
n(1 + γ)(V − c1)
...
n(1 + γ)(V − cn)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ = n(1 + γ)B
−1
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
V − c1
...
V − cn
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ .
For each i = 1, ...,m (i.e., i ∈ S),
qC∗i = n(1+γ)[
V − ci
2n
− (4n+ (n−m+ 2)γ)mγ(V − cS)
2nω1
− (n−m)γ(V − c−S)
ω1
]
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=
n(1 + γ)(2n+ γ)V
ω1
+
(1 + γ)[4n+ (n−m+ 2) γ]mγcS
2ω1
+
n(1 + γ)(n−m)γc−S
ω1
− (1 + γ)ci
2
.
This gives (19). For each j = m+ 1, ..., n (i.e., j ∈ N\S),
qC∗j = n(1 + γ)[
V − cj
2n+ γ
− mγ(V − cS)
ω1
− (2n+mγ)(n−m)γ(V − c−S)
(2n+ γ)ω1
]
=
n(1 + γ)(2n+mγ)V
ω1
+
n(1 + γ)mγcS
ω1
+
n (n−m) (1 + γ)(2n+mγ)γc−S
(2n+ γ)ω1
− n(1 + γ)cj
2n+ γ
.
This gives (20). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Part (i) The eﬀects of single-product firm’s cost reduc-
tions are straightforward.
Part (ii) For each i ∈ S, the eﬀects of its cost reduction on j /∈ S are straight-
forward, so we only need to show the eﬀects on each j ∈ S. Diﬀerentiating (26)
and (29) with respect to ci leads to
i)
∂q∗j
∂ci
=
½ 1+γ
2
− ω4
2nω2
> 0 if j 6= i,
− ω4
2nω2
< 0 if j = i,
(42)
ii)
∂(p∗j − cj)
∂ci
=
(
γ2(n−m)
2ω2
> 0 if j 6= i,
γ2(n−m)
2ω2
− 1
2
< 0 if j = i;
(43)
where ω2 is given by (25), and ω4 > 0 is given by
ω4(n,m, γ) = γ3 (n−m) [2 (n− 1)2 + n(m− 1)] + γ2n[(2n−m) (2n+m− 5)
+n (4n− 3m− 1) + 2] + 2γn2 (5n−m− 3) + 4n3. (44)
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For j 6= i, the positive sign of ∂q∗j/∂ci follows from
∂q∗j
∂ci
=
1 + γ
2
− ω4
2nω2
=
[γ2 (3n− 2) (n−m) + γn (7n− 3m− 2) + 4n2]γ
2nω2
> 0
and the negative sign of ∂(p∗i − ci)/∂ci follows from ∂(p∗i − ci)/∂ci =
γ2 (n−m)
2ω2
− 1
2
= −4n
2 + 2nγ (3n−m− 1) + γ2 (n−m) (2n+m− 3)
2ω2
< 0.
By (42) and (43), the eﬀects on unit i’s and j’s output and markup satisfy the
following properties: for i 6= j ∈ S,
∂q∗i
∂ci
=
∂q∗j
∂ci
− 1 + γ
2
, and (45)
∂ (p∗i − ci)
∂ci
=
∂(p∗j − cj)
∂ci
− 1
2
.
Using (42-43) and (45), one has
∂π∗S
∂ci
=
∂
Pm
j=1 π
∗
j
∂ci
=
∂[(p∗i − ci)q∗i ]
∂ci
+
X
j∈S\i
∂[(p∗j − cj)q∗j ]
∂ci
=
−q
∗
i + (1 + γ) (p
∗
i − ci)
2
+
∂(p∗k − ck)
∂ci
X
j∈S
q∗j +
∂q∗k
∂ci
X
j∈S
(p∗j − cj), for any k 6= i ∈ S,
= −q
∗
i + (1 + γ) (p
∗
i − ci)
2
+
γ2 (n−m)
Pm
j=1 q
∗
j
2ω2
+
[γ2 (3n− 2) (n−m) + γn (7n− 3m− 2) + 4n2]γ
Pm
j=1(p
∗
j − cj)
2nω2
.
25
Applying (4-5) with nj = m to the above expression, one has
∂π∗S
∂ci
= −2nq
∗
i +mγ(p
∗
S − cS)
2n
+
γ2 (n−m)
Pm
j=1 q
∗
j
2ω2
+
[γ2 (3n− 2) (n−m) + γn (7n− 3m− 2) + 4n2]γ
Pm
j=1 q
∗
j
2(n(1 + γ)−mγ)ω2
= −q∗i −
nγ
Pm
j=1 q
∗
j
2n(n(1 + γ)−mγ) +
γ2 (n−m)
Pm
j=1 q
∗
j
2ω2
+
[γ2 (3n− 2) (n−m) + γn (7n− 3m− 2) + 4n2]γ
Pm
j=1 q
∗
j
2(n(1 + γ)−mγ)ω2
= −q∗i +
γ2 (n−m)
Pm
j=1 q
∗
j
ω2
,
which leads to
∂π∗S
∂ci
> 0⇔ tSi < btS = γ2 (n−m)ω2 . (46)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1: (i) By (23), (26), (28), and (29),
(p∗i − ci)− (p∗S − cS) =
γ2m (n−m) + 2ω3
2ω2
cS −
ci
2
=
cS − ci
2
,
which leads to q∗i − q∗S =
[γ2 (3n− 2) (n−m) + γn (7n− 3m− 2) + 4n2]mγcS
2nω2
−(1 + γ)ci
2
+
(n(1 + γ)−mγ)ω3cS
nω3
26
= (1 + γ) (cS − ci)/2, which in turn leads to
(p∗i − ci)− (p∗S − cS) =
cS − ci
2
, and (47)
q∗i − q∗S =
(1 + γ) (cS − ci)
2
. (48)
Substituting (48) into the expression for ∂π∗S/∂ci in the proof of Proposition 2, one
has:
∂π∗S
∂ci
=
mγ2 (n−m) q∗S
ω2
− q∗S −
(1 + γ) (cS − ci)
2
=
−2ω3q∗S
ω2
− (1 + γ) (cS − ci)
2
.
By ω2 > 0 and ω3 > 0, cS − ci > 0 implies ∂π∗S/∂ci < 0, so part (i) holds.
(ii) When m = n, btS = 0. By (46), ∂π∗S/∂ci > 0 is impossible, so ∂π∗S/∂ci < 0
holds for all i. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 2: By (27), π∗S = π
∗
S(ci) is convex and quadratic in ci, and its
minimum point bcSi , or the solution of ∂π∗S/∂ci = 0, is given by
bcSi = ω54(n(1 + γ)−mγ)(ω3)2 + n(m− 1)(1 + γ)(ω2)2 , (49)
where ω2 and ω3 are given in (25) and (30), and ω5 > 0 is given by
ω5(n,m, γ) = 4m(n(1 + γ)−mγ)ω3[n(2n(1 + γ)− γ)V + γ(n(1 + γ)− γ)(n−m)c−S]
+[n(1 + γ)(ω2)2 − 4(n(1 + γ)−mγ)(ω3)2]Σj∈S\icj.
Because π∗S is symmetric in ci around ci = bcSi , small reductions in ci reduce π∗S ⇐⇒
ci is on the right half of the profit curve where π∗S is increasing in ci. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: (i) Let δi = ci − bcSi > 0. One has π∗S(ci − δi) = π∗S(bcSi ) =
Min { π∗S(ci) | ci ≥ 0}. By the symmetry of π∗S(ci) around bcSi , π∗S(ci − 2δi) =
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π∗S(ci). Therefore, ∆ci > 2δi implies π
∗
S(ci−∆ci) > π∗S(ci−2δi) = π∗S(ci), which
leads to (50). The reverse also holds obviously. Suppose the multiproduct firm’s
most eﬃcient product is good 1 (i.e., c1 = min{ci | 1 ≤ i ≤ m}). For i ∈ S with
ci > bcSi , where bcSi is given in (49), let ∆ci > 0 be the reduction in ci. Let π∗S(ci)
denote the multiproduct firm’s profits given in (27) when firm i’s marginal cost
is ci. Then, the following two claims hold:
(i) π∗S(ci −∆ci) > π∗S(ci)⇔ ∆ci > 2(ci − bcSi ); (50)
(ii) ci − c1 > 2(ci − bcSi ).
(ii) By
γ2 (n−m)
ω2
− 1
2m+ 2
=
γ2 (n−m) (2m+ 2)− ω2
(2m+ 2)ω2
= −γ
2 (n−m) (2n−m− 4) + 2nγ (3n−m− 1) + 4n2
(2m+ 2)ω2
< 0,
the critical output share btS in (46) satisfies
btS < 1
2m+ 2
. (51)
As insider i keeps reducing its marginal cost from ci > bcSi to bcSi and eventually to
c1, its output share will increase from below btS to above btS, further to 1/m > btS,
and eventually to above 1/m, because firm 1 is the most eﬃcient insider. When
its marginal cost falls below bcSi , the multiproduct firm’s profits will start to
increase.
By (51) and by tSi < btS,
btS − tSi < 12m+ 2 < 12m.
However, (51) also implies
1
m
− btS > 1
m
− 1
2m+ 2
=
m+ 2
(2m+ 2)m
>
1
2m
.
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Because insiders’ outputs in (26) are linear in marginal costs, the above two in-
equalities imply that the reduction in ci equivalent to a share increase from btS to 1/m
is much larger than δi = ci−bcSi > 0, which is the reduction in ci equivalent to a share
increase from tSi to btS. Because more reductions are needed for ci to eventually reach
c1 (i.e., for its output share to increase from 1/m to firm 1s output share in S), one
must have ci − c1 > 2δi,which completes the proof of part (ii). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: Substituting m = 2, ω2 = 2n[(n−2)γ2+3 (n− 1) γ+2n],
c1 = c − µ and ci = c for i > 1 into (26), one gets the following equilibrium
outputs:
q∗1 =
[2n(1 + γ)− γ][n(1 + γ)− 2γ](V − c)
2n[γ2(n− 2) + 3γ (n− 1) + 2n]
+
γ3(n− 2)(2n2 − 3n+ 2) + γ2n(8n2 − 17n+ 8) + 10γn2(n− 1) + 4n3
4n2[γ2(n− 2) + 3γ (n− 1) + 2n] µ,
q∗2 =
[2n(1 + γ)− γ][n(1 + γ)− 2γ](V − c)
2n[γ2(n− 2) + 3γ (n− 1) + 2n] −
γ[γ2(n− 2)(3n− 2) + γn(7n− 8) + 4n2]µ
4n2[γ2(n− 2) + 3γ (n− 1) + 2n] ,
q∗j =
[n(1 + γ)− γ]2(V − c)
n[γ2(n− 2) + 3γ (n− 1) + 2n] −
γ[n(1 + γ)− γ][n(1 + γ)− 2γ]µ
4n2[γ2(n− 2) + 3γ (n− 1) + 2n]
for j = 3, ..., n. It is straightforward to verify that q∗1 > q
∗
j > q
∗
2. Based on the
above expression for q∗2, q
∗
2 = 0 if
µ = µB ≡ 2n[2n(1 + γ)− γ][n(1 + γ)− 2γ]
γ[γ2(n− 2)(3n− 2) + γn(7n− 8) + 4n2](V − c).
Given µ = µB, the equilibrium profits become:
π∗S = (p
∗
1 − c1)q∗1; π∗j =
n
n(1 + γ)− γ (q
∗
j )
2, j = 3, ..., n,
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where
q∗1 = {1 +
[γ2(2n− 1)(n− 2) + 6γn(n− 1) + 4n2][n(1 + γ)− 2γ]
γ[γ2(n− 2)(3n− 2) + γn(7n− 8) + 4n2] }
× [2n(1 + γ)− γ][n(1 + γ)− 2γ]
2n[γ2(n− 2) + 3γ (n− 1) + 2n](V − c),
p∗1 − c1 = {1 +
γ3(n− 2)(2n2 − 3n+ 2) + γ2n(8n2 − 17n+ 8) + 10γn2(n− 1) + 4n3
γ[γ2(n− 2)(3n− 2) + γn(7n− 8) + 4n2] }
× [2n(1 + γ)− γ]
2[γ2(n− 2) + 3γ (n− 1) + 2n](V − c), and for j = 3, ..., n,
q∗j =
n(1 + γ)[n(1 + γ)− γ]
γ2(n− 2)(3n− 2) + γn(7n− 8) + 4n2 (V − c).
If product 2 is removed, the industry becomes a single-product oligopoly with
(n-1) firms. Evaluated at c1 = c−µB and cj = c for j > 1, the new equilibrium
profits are:
π01 =
(n− 1)(1 + γ)− γ
n− 1 (p
0
1 − c1)2, and
π0j =
n− 1
(n− 1)(1 + γ)− γ (q
0
j )
2, j = 3, ..., n,
where p01 − c1 =
φ(n, γ)(V − c)
γ[(n− 1)(2 + γ)− γ][2(n− 1)(1 + γ)− γ][γ2(n− 2)(3n− 2) + γn(7n− 8) + 4n2] ,
q0j =
1
(n− 1)(2 + γ)− γ (V − c){(n− 1)−
2n[(n− 1)(1 + γ)− γ][2n(1 + γ)− γ][n(1 + γ)− 2γ]
[(n− 1)(2 + γ)− γ][2(n− 1)(1 + γ)− γ][γ2(n− 2)(3n− 2) + γn(7n− 8) + 4n2]},
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φ(n, γ) = r4 (n− 2)
¡
11n+ 5n2 − 12n3 + 4n4 − 6
¢
+r3
¡
105n3 − 15n2 − 36n− 84n4 + 20n5 + 8
¢
+4r2n
¡
32n2 − 7n− 31n3 + 9n4 − 2
¢
+4rn2 (n− 1)
¡
7n2 − 12n+ 3
¢
+ 8n3 (n− 1)2 .
Applying above expressions to (π∗j − π0j) and (π∗S − π01), one gets: (π∗j − π0j) =
h(n, γ)(V − c)2
(n− 1)[(n− 1)(2 + γ)− γ]4[2(n− 1)(1 + γ)− γ]2[γ2(n− 2)(3n− 2) + γn(7n− 8) + 4n2]2 ,
π∗S − π01 =
k(n, γ)
ϕ(n, γ)
(V − c)2,
where the terms h(n, γ), k(n, γ), and ϕ(n, γ) are too long to be reported here.
A complete proof with such details is given in Appendix C, which is available
to readers upon request. These three polynomials share the feature that the
highest order term has a positive coeﬃcient. It is straightforward, although
tedious, to show that these three terms are positive. To see h(n, γ) > 0, one first
shows h(3, γ) > 0. Then, using Maple software, one can show that none of the
real roots for n in h(n, γ) = 0 is greater than 2, which implies that h(n, γ) > 0
holds for all n > 2. Similarly, one can show k(n, γ) > 0 and ϕ(n, γ) > 0. Hence,
π∗j > π
0
j and π
∗
S > π
0
1 hold. Q.E.D.
Derivation for (33)-(37): Using (19-20), the industry’s average output is
qC∗ =
1
n
[
X
i∈S
qC∗i +
X
i/∈S
qC∗i ]
=
(1 + γ)(2n2 +m(n−m+ 1)γ)V
ω1
− m(1 + γ)(2n+ γ)cS
ω1
− (n−m)(1 + γ)(2n+mγ)c−S
ω1
.
Applying this expression and (19) to the inverse demand equation (10) gives
(33-34). (35-37) are straightforward. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 5: Part (i) For each i /∈ S, diﬀerentiating (19-20) with re-
spect to ci leads to
∂qC∗j
∂ci
=
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
n(1+γ)γ
ω1
> 0 if j ∈ S;
n(1+γ)(2n+mγ)γ
(2n+γ)ω1
> 0 if j /∈ S, j 6= i;
−n(1+γ)[m(n+1−m)γ2+2n(n+m)γ+4n2]
(2n+γ)ω1
< 0 if j /∈ S, j = i.
The profit eﬀects follow from (35-37) and the above product eﬀects.
Part (ii) For each i ∈ S, the eﬀects of its cost reduction on a single-product firm
j /∈ S are straightforward, so we only need to show the eﬀects on each j ∈ S.
Diﬀerentiating (19) and (37) with respect to ci leads to
∂qC∗j
∂ci
=
(
γ(1+γ)(4n+(n−m+2)γ)
2ω1
> 0 if j 6= i,
γ(1+γ)(4n+(n−m+2)γ)
2ω1
− 1+γ
2
< 0 if j = i;
(52)
∂
¡
pC∗j − cj
¢
∂ci
=
(
− (n−m)γ2
2ω1
< 0 if j 6= i,
− (n−m)γ2
2ω1
− 1
2
< 0 if j = i.
(53)
The negative sign of ∂qi/∂ci follows from
∂qC∗i
∂ci
=
γ(1 + γ)(4n+ (n−m+ 2)γ)
2ω1
− 1 + γ
2
= −(1 + γ)[4n
2 + 2n(n+m− 1)γ + (m− 1)(n−m+ 2)γ2]
2ω1
< 0.
Now, consider the profit eﬀects. for any i 6= j ∈ S, (52-53) lead to
∂qC∗i
∂ci
=
∂qC∗j
∂ci
− 1 + γ
2
, and (54)
∂
¡
pC∗i − ci
¢
∂ci
=
∂
¡
pC∗j − cj
¢
∂ci
− 1
2
.
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Using (52-54), one has
∂πC∗S
∂ci
=
∂
Pm
j=1 π
C∗
j
∂ci
=
∂
Pm
j=1(p
C∗
j − cj)qC∗j
∂ci
=
qC∗i ∂(p
C∗
i − ci)
∂ci
+
(pC∗i − ci)∂qC∗i
∂ci
+
X
j∈S\i
[
qC∗j ∂(p
C∗
j − cj)
∂ci
+
(pC∗j − cj)∂qC∗j
∂cj
]
= −q
C∗
i + (1 + γ) (p
C∗
i − ci)
2
+
X
j∈S
[−
qC∗j γ
2 (n−m)
2ω1
+
(pC∗j − cj)γ(1 + γ)(4n+ (n−m+ 2)γ)
2ω1
]
= −q
C∗
i + (1 + γ) (p
C∗
i − ci)
2
− m (n−m) γ
2qC∗S
2ω1
+
mγ(1 + γ)[4n+ (n−m+ 2)γ](pC∗S − cS)
2ω1
.
Applying the relationship
(1 + γ) (pi − ci) = qi +
mγqS
n
and
pS − cS
qS
=
n+mγ
n(1 + γ)
given in (15-16), one has
∂πC∗S
∂ci
= −
qC∗i + q
C∗
i +
mγqC∗S
n
2
− mγ
2 (n−m) qC∗S
2ω1
+
mγ(1 + γ)(4n+ (n−m+ 2)γ)
2ω1
(n+mγ) qC∗S
n(1 + γ)
= −qC∗i − [
mγ
2n
+
mγ2 (n−m)
2ω1
− mγ(4n+ (n−m+ 2)γ) (n+mγ)
2nω1
]qC∗S
= −qC∗i −
m (n−m) γ2
ω1
qC∗S < 0
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 6: The proof is similar to that of Proposition 4. A com-
plete proof with detailed terms is given in Appendix C, which is available upon
request. Q.E.D.
Appendix B
The profit functions in a homogeneous Cournot oligopoly with liner costs are πi(x) =
(p(Σxj)− ci)xi, all i. Let X = Σxj, then firm i’s and j’s (j 6= i) choices are called
strategic substitutes if
αi = ∂2πi/∂xi∂xj = p0(X) + xip00(X) ≤ 0,
and strategic complements if αi > 0. Let E = Xp00(X)/p0(X) be the elasticity of
the slope of inverse demand, si = xi/X be firm i’s market share. By αi > 0 ⇔
−αi/p0(X) = −(1 + siE) > 0, strategic complementarity is equivalent to
−siE > 1. (55)
Dixit (1986) showed that the stability of the system (i.e., conditions for comparative
statistics) requires
∆ = 1 + Σ(αi/p0(X)) = n+ 1 +E > 0, (56)
and most previous works on comparative statics have assumed a much stronger con-
dition, E > −1 (see Shapiro [1989] for survey).
Lemma 1 Consider a firm i in the above homogeneous Cournot oligopoly with non-
linear demands and linear costs. Let π∗i be its equilibrium profits, and assume: i)
αi > 0; and ii) E > −(n+ 1/2). Then, ∂π∗i /∂ci < 0 holds.
Proof of Lemma 1: Simplifying the output eﬀects of a small cost reduction in
Smythe and Zhao (2006, p. 184) leads to:
∂xi
∂ci
=
(n+ 1 +E)p0(X)− [p0(X) + xip00(X)]
(n+ 1 +E) (p0(X))2
,
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∂xk
∂ci
=
− (p0(X) + xkp00(X))
(n+ 1 +E) (p0(X))2
, all k 6= i.
Using envelope theorem and the above expressions, one obtains:
∂π∗i
∂ci
= xip0(X)Σj 6=i
∂xj
∂ci
− xi = xiΣj 6=i
p0(X) + xjp00(X)
(n+ 1 +E) (−p0(X)) − xi (57)
= −xi
∙
Σj 6=i
1 + sjE
(n+ 1 +E)
+ 1
¸
=
−xi [2n+ (2− si)E]
(n+ 1 +E)
. (58)
With strategic substitutes (i.e., αi ≤ 0), ∂π∗i /∂ci < 0 follows immediately from
(56) and (57). With strategic complements (i.e., αi > 0), the first term or
the sum in (57) becomes positive, which suggests the possibility of ∂π∗i /∂ci >
0.7 However, such possibility is prevented by the assumptions. Substituting
(55) into [2n+ (2− si)E] in (58), one has [2n+ (2− si)E] > [2n+ 2E + 1] =
2(E + n+ 1/2). Hence, assumption ii) (which implies (56)) leads to
[2n+ (2− si)E]
(n+ 1 +E)
> 0.
By (58), ∂π∗i /∂ci < 0 holds. Q.E.D.
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